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Rector, 
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Change' 
Excellencies, distinguished colleagues and students of the ISS, ladies 
and gentlemen, 
People like me: 
Many people appear to believe that there are a growing number of 
religious conflicts in the world, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War. On closer examination, however, it seems that the number of 
conflicts of the type which are today often labelled 'ethnic' or' 'reli-
gious' has in fact been growing since the 1950s'. Many such conflicts 
were already detectable in the period of the Cold War, but at that time, 
they were usually interpreted within a framework of East-West re-
lations. 
There has, without doubt, been a change in the patterns of violent con-
flict in the world since the end of the Cold War, but above all there 
has been a massive shift in perceptions. Among the world's recent 
conflicts which are now seen as primarily religious in nature are, for 
example, Bosnia, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia and others. 
This development is one reason for a growing interest in religion in 
relation to hllman rights, a subject which, it may even be argued, has 
been one of the main features of the human rights debate in recent 
years.2 Many people in the West, where secular politics are consid-
ered the norm, seem to have come to the conclusion that religion is all 
1. Tim Allen & Jean Seaton (eds.), The media of conflict: War reporting and re-
presentations of ethnic violence. London and New York: Zed Books, 1999, pp. 
11-42, and esp. p.22. 
2. A wealth of literature has been produced during the last ten years, which in var-
ious ways introduces religion as a critical factor in human rights matters, not 
only in relation to conflict. Cf. David Little, 'Rethinldng human rights: a review 
essay on religion, relativism and other matters', Journal of Religious Ethics, 
vol. 27, no. 1, 1999, pp. 151-177. 
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too often a negative aspect of human culture, that it divides people 
rather than unites them. As a result, there exists a widely-held belief 
today that religion is responsible for abuses of human rights more 
often than it is a factor in their protection. 
This contrasts rather sharply with the period before the 1990s, when 
academics as well as policymalcers often failed to appreciate the sig-
nificance of religion in the political realm because of an undiscrimi-
nating belief in the inevitability of secularization. We may now see 
that secular pressures often in fact strengthen religious belief.3 The 
emergence of a worldwide vibrant political Islam may be considered 
as one telling example; similar tendencies towards a return to the fun-
damentals of faith can also be discerned within other major religious 
traditions.4 
Some views of human rights 
Until the last years of the twentieth century, secularism appeared to 
political elites throughout the world to be an unstoppable force, and 
human rights ,to be very largely a matter of legislation. Hence, in the 
academic field, the debate on human rights, including in matters con-
cerning religion, has been dominated by experts on international law 
and other jurists. On occasion, theologians and scholars of religion 
have also added their voices, but without developing any systematic 
analysis. of the relationship between religion and human rights. 
3. lb.: 55. Cf. also Jeff Haynes, Religion in global politics. London and New York: 
Longman, 1998. 
4. For a recent analysis of political Islam, see John L. Esposito (ed.), Political 
Islam: Revolution, radicalism, or reform? Boulder and London: Lynne Riener, 
1997. For a general overview and analysis of fundamentalism in different reli-
gious traditions in the world, see the five volumes which have emerged from 
the Fundamentalism Project carried out by the University of Chicago under the 
leadership of Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. See notably volume one: 
2 
Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Systematic thought has been more forthcoming from ethical philoso-
phers, both in the Western and non-Western world.s A contribution 
from this quarter is hardly surprising considering that the moral 
dimension of human activity is of central concern to the human rights 
debate. 
Nowhere do these remarks apply with greater pertinence than in dis-
cussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This 
is now often interpreted primarily as a legal document, which no 
doubt for this reason has received most attention from scholars work-
ing within the field of law. In retrospect, more than fifty years after 
the Declaration, it is becoming clear that legal instruments are not 
enough if human rights are to be firmly grounded in different cultures, 
as people's understanding of human rights is informed by their own 
world views and cosmologies. It is plain that in many countries 
human rights ideology finds its theoretical justification in religion. 
Yet, the human rights concept as expressed in the Universal 
Declaration is at root a secular idea. For it seems that of all the cul-
tural factors which affect views of humanity and human rights in dif-
ferent parts of the world, none is more important than religion. It is 
as a consequence of such different viewpoints that today a number of 
other human rights declarations exist which reflect the particular 
world view of their designers.6 Although the emergence of alternative 
declarations has often been politically inspired, the fact that the 
5. One leading example is the Journal of Religious Ethics, published in the United 
States. See notably the special issue on human rights, vol. 26, no. 2, 1998. 
6. Notably the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam of 1993, which has 
be'en adopted by some fifty member states of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). Earlier, in 1981, a Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights (UlDHR) was drafted under the auspices of the Islamic Council, a 
London-based organization affiliated with the Muslim World League. Apart 
from these, there are various documents concerning Islamic human rights pol-
icy. More recently, a debate has emerged on Asian values in human rights, 
which resulted in the so-called Bangkok Declaration. This Declaration was 
drafted at a regional preparatory meeting in Bangkok prior to the Second World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. 
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Universal Declaration conceives human rights in a purely secular 
mode is nevertheless a matter of genuine concern for many otherwise 
sympathetic observers, notably outside the Western world.7 
Clearly, if we wish for a successful inculturation of human rights, we 
must give serious thought to the role played by religion.s For most 
people in the world, religion is an integral part of their existence, 
inseparable from the social and moral order, and it defines their rela-
tions with other human beings. If relations between human beings are 
central to the concept of human rights, it becomes· important to con-
sider whether, in any given society, these relations have been 
informed by a religious world view or whether the philosophical basis 
is a secular one. In the case of the former, believers often feel that the 
way in which they perceive the wofld does not find sufficient recog-
nition in the Universal Declaration. We may say, with hindsight, that 
the Universal Declaration is itself a product of the secular develop-
ments that I referred to earlier on. The phrase 'human rights', after all, 
implies two separate concepts: the existence of human beings, and the 
7. This became clear, for example, during the meeting of the Parliament of the 
World's Religions in Cape Town in December 1999, which contained a number 
of panels on religion and human rights. 
8. Many observers have commented on the need for the inculturation of human 
rights. Some examples are: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (ed.), Human rights in 
cross-cultural perspective (philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1992); David Little, John Kelsay & Abulaziz Sachedina, Human rights and the 
conflict of cultures (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); and 
Wolfgang Schmale (ed.), Human rights and cultural diversity: Europe, Arabic-
Islamic world, Africa, China (Goldbach: Keip, 1993). More specifically on the 
role of religion, see for example: Irene Bloom, J. Paul Martin & Wayne L. 
Proudfoot (eds.), Religious diversity and human rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996); John Kelsay & Sumner B. Twiss (eds.), Religion and 
human rights (New York: The Project on Religion and Human Rights, 1995); 
John Witte & John van de Vyver (eds.), Religious human rights in global per-
spective. Vol. I: Religious perspectives (Den Haag: Kluwer, 1996). For a histori-
cal and comparative perspective, see also Yael Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulos & 
Clarence J. Dias (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty 
years and beyond (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing Company, 
1999). 
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assertion that they have inalienable rights. Scholarly debate on the 
Universal Declaration invariably turns upon the nature of these rights 
and ways of applying them, without questioning the notion of a 
human being. That is, in addressing the fundamental question of a 
human's rights and the universal application of these, the Declaration 
takes it for granted that we all agree upon what precisely is a human 
being. The question regarding the actual nature of a human being is in 
many cases deemed to be a metaphysical one, and is therefore often 
expressed in religion. To avoid any misunderstanding, I am not argu-
ing that there is anything fundamentally flawed in the Universal 
Declaration; what I am saying is that in view of what we lmow now, 
one may consider that perhaps it is simply not explicit enough in cer-
tain areas. In the view of many, it lacks a profound view of what a 
human being is. 
Interestingly, the same point has recently been made by Vaclav Havel, 
when he asks why human beings have the prerogative to enjoy human 
rights. The answer he has advanced resembles that of many non-
Western critics. 'I am convinced', he states, ' that the deepest roots of 
what we now call human rights lie somewhere beyond us, and above 
us; somewhere deeper than the world of human covenants ~ a realm 
that I would, for simplicity's salce, describe as metaphysical'.9 One 
viable course, in his view, out of the problems that may arise from a 
difference in world view over the interpretation of human rights, is 
placing emphasis on their spiritual source. We should make an effort, 
he argues, to highlight the spiritual dimension and spiritual origin of 
the values guarded by the United Nations and translate this into the 
Organization's practical activities. lO Whatever our personal views on 
this may be, it seems evident that present circumstances require a 
rethinldng of the relationship between religion and human rights. This 
is necessary in order to address some of the changes that have taken 
9. Vaclav Havel, in Danieli et aI., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 
332. 
10. lb., p. 333-4. . 
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place in recent decades and which have shed new light on the role of 
religion in human rights matters. 
Consideration of the place of religion in the social and political cir-
cumstances of today's world raises a number of important questions, 
not all of which can be discussed here and now. I will limit myself to 
discussing only those points which I believe need .our most urgent 
scholarly attention. I will mention three in this address, which I will 
discuss in a particular order. I will begin with the most widely rec-
ognized of the debates raised by notions of globalization in regard to 
human rights, namely the issue of cultural relativism. Second, I will 
review the relationship between religion and culture, which, in my 
view, takes the inquiry further .. Finally, I will conclude with what 
seems to me to lie at the heart of the matter, namely the way in which 
many of the world's people conceive of a human being in partly spir-
itual terms. The third and last of these points is particularly important 
since the question of human rights is bound up with a given society's 
fundamental view of what one author refers to as 'what sort of thing 
a human being is'H. This really is a consideration of the elements 
which separate human beings from other categories and by virtue of 
which they may enjoy certain rights. 
Cultural relativism 
The task, of providing a common moral language for all humanity is 
fraught with difficulties. The central paradox here is that achieving 
such a goal requires a prior development of an indigenous human 
rights language within the various moral traditions of the world. 12 
Given the state of affairs in the world today, there is increasing doubt 
as to whether a worldwide consensus on human rights can ever be 
11. Thunnan, in Bloom et al., Religious diversity and human rights, p. 90. 
12. James Turner Johnson, 'Human rights and violence in contemporary context', 
Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 26, no. 2, 1998, p. 326. 
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achieved. In a controversial essay published in 1993 Samuel 
Huntington suggested that certain differences between peoples and 
populations can never be bridged. I3 His argument is that there is a fun-
damental incompatibility between different types of civilization, 
whose traditions have been shaped over centuries. The most impor-
tant source of conflict in the world today, in his view, is not ideolog-
ical or economic but cultural. According to Huntington, we are expe-
riencing a clash of civilizations in the world, in which religion plays 
a major role. Since there is no prospect of unity being created out of 
the world's cultural diversity, he proposes that the Western world 
should accept that these cultural 'fault lines' exist. Western countries 
should therefore rather strive for unity within their own cultural field, 
and cooperate primarily with those whose cultures are closest to their 
own. 
Huntington's line of thought, which has been influential though 
much-criticized,I4 is at odds with the vision of the Universal 
Declaration, which maintains that there are certain values which are 
shared by all peoples. Is Huntington's outlook, however, stands in a 
long tradition. I may cite, for example, the precedent offered by the 
American Anthropological Society which in 1947 opposed the adop-
tion of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the grounds that 
individual .cultures had their own standards and values, and later 
accused the drafters of ethnocentrism. I6 American anthropologists of 
13. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, 
no. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49. The argument was further elaborated in his book The 
. clash of civilizations and the remaking of world orde/: New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996. 
14. See later issues of Foreign Affairs, notably vol. 72, no 4. 
15. Many of these, incidentally, are considered to be present in most, if not all, reli-
gions. This is a view commonly held, in any case, by religious believers them-
selves, as well as by those who have been writing specifically on the subject of 
religion and human rights. 
16. See Johannes Morsink's 'Introduction: The Declaration at fifty' , in The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, drafting and intent. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. 
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fifty years ago, like Samuel Huntington today, found it hard to believe 
that human beings may find ways to transcend their cultural divides. 
Rather than the cultural fault lines identified by Huntington, the 
vision embodied in the Universal Declaration acknowledges the exis-
. tence of a cultural weave underlying a common human pattern. If we 
accept this to be so, it means that in human rights thinking the human 
is the fundamental category, and not culture. 17 Such matters are ulti-
mately a matter of faith, which is why belief in the universality of 
human rights is sometimes referred to as a secular religion. 
In view of this type of culturalist critique, it is important to remind 
ourselves that the Universal Declaration was the work of a team of 
both Western and non-Western drafters, standing in different religious 
traditions.The core group of eightdrafiers comprised representatives 
from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the former Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. IS In the final 
phase, only eight of the 58 states involved in the process decided to 
abstain from voting on adoption of the Declaration, including South 
Africa, the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. 19 It is significant that none 
of the dissenters voted against the Declaration. 
The drafters of this document clearly considered how to make a uni-
versal appeal to people of different cultures, for their aim was to com-
municate a vision to ordinary people, men and women from all walles 
17. Cf. Irene Bloom, 'Religious diversity and human rights: an introduction', in 
Bloom 'et al, Religious diversity and human rights, pp. 1-11, notably pp. 2-3. 
18. When we look at the composition of the General Assembly, we see that of the 
58 national representatives 37, i.e.' a majority, stood in the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition, 11 in the Islamic, 6 in the Marxist and 4 in the Buddhist tradition. There 
was, however, a notable under-representation from Asia and Mrica. For a 
detailed record, see Morsinlc, The Universal Declaration of Humcln Rights, Ch: 
1: 'The drafting process explained'. 
19. lb., p. (21-27). We should mention here the significant influence of some 
Muslim drafters, and also the strong influence of notably Latin American 
socialists, to whom we owe the inclusion of social, economic and cultural rights 
in the Declaration. 
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of life in all parts of the world. Such· a vision has great mobilizing 
power, which is precisely what governments and others wielding 
political power often fear in the Universal Declaration. Its claim to 
universality, I would argue, lies much more in its conviction that it 
can be shared by all people, whoever and wherever they are, than in 
the likelihood that its principles will actually be respected by political 
elites. The principal aim of the Declaration was thus an educational 
one: every person was to be aware of certain fundamental values in 
order to prevent a repeat of the horrors which had occurred during the 
Second World War with its 50 million dead, only months before the 
Declaration was drafted. 
In his book Modernity and the Holocaust the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has argued that the atrocities of the Second World War were 
made possible by the systematic repression of the moral dimension of 
people's acts in modem industrial society.20 If this is so, it is all the 
more disturbing because 'modernity', as it is often referred to,21 has 
today made inroads in all societies worldwide. The globalization of 
life which has accompanied modernity has given a new impulse to the 
debate on universalism versus particularism in human rights. The 
argument in favour of universality may be strengthened by the obser-
vation that in a globalized world, norms and values are likely to be 
influenced by the process of globalization. On the other hand, it is 
increasingly argued outside the Western world, by politicians espe-
cially, that globalization threatens the specific identity of individual 
societies. Every country therefore (or so it is argued) should be 
20. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1989. 
21. Theorists of globalization make a distinction between the first and the second 
modernity. Whereas in the first modernity there was an equation of state, soci-
ety and identity, in the second modernity this equation is undermined by new 
developments inherent in the processes of globalization. The most important 
dimensions of globalization are considered to be communications technology, 
ecology, economics, work organization, culture and civil society. See Ulrich 
Beck, What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, notably p. 19. 
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allowed to develop its own particular philosophy of human rights, 
based on its own cultural values. In many cases this is explicitly relat-
ed to the religious morality of a particular culture or society. The 
Islamic Declaration on Human Rights is one example. Another is the 
Bangkok Declaration, drafted in the early 1990s by some forty states 
from the Asian and Pacific region, which made a plea to consider 'the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various his-
torical, cultural and religious backgrounds' in interpreting and apply-
ing human rights.22 Culture-related values, however, as feminist writ-
ers especially have pointed out, can be very oppressive for social and 
religious minorities inasmuch as they tend to deny cultural and reli-
gious diversity within a given society.23 
It is notable that a related debate has arisen in Western societies, such 
as Europe and North America, in the form of the heated issue of mul-
ticulturalism. The argument here turns upon the degree to which our 
societies should encourage minority groups to nurture specific cultur-
al and religious identities. Inherent in this is a perception similar to 
that of the Islamic and Asian activists whom I have just mentioned: 
namely, that certain groups of people are so different from us as to 
require different treatment, in conformity with those norms and val-
ues which are aeemed to be their own. Some influential analysts, 
including Kwame Anthony Appiah and Michael Ignatieff, have 
labelled this view the 'narcissism of minor difference' .24 Labelling 
people as 'not like us' always concerns matters of identity - who are 
we and who are they? The merits of the argument must be examined , 
case by case. For example, I have argued elsewhere in regard to 
22. Quoted in Little, 'Rethinking human rights', p. 153. 
23. See e.g. Harriet Samuel's discussion of this in her article, 'Hong Kong on 
women, Asian values, and the law', Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, 
1999, pp. 707-734. 
24. See Michael Ignatieff, The warrior's honor: Ethnic war and the modem con-
science. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1997, p. 54. See also Kwame Anthony 
Appiah in an interview with de Volkskrant on 23 October 1999 commenting on 
his essay 'Color conscious: the political morality of race'. 
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African immigrants in Europe that it is often Europeans, and not 
Africans themselves, who insist on the need for Africans to develop 
their own (meaning African) identity. In effect such an argument 
becomes a mechanism of exclusion, a discourse which contributes to 
the defence of Fortress Europe.25 
Perceptions of human difference are inseparable from perceptions of 
identity. Whether we are discussing human rights in the international 
arena or group rights within multicultural societies, it is of crucial 
importance to establish who is the agent in defining people's identi-
ties. Who precisely is advocating a position of exception, an,d for 
whom? Often, it is not the victims but the violators of human rights 
who use a relativist argument against the principle of universality.26 
One instance is that of the late President Mobutu of Zaire, who argued 
that his country should be exempt from international norms on the 
grounds that Zaireans had their own authentic way of doing things. 
Conversely, relatively powerless indigenous groups may seek to pro-
tect their communal rights by invoIcing universal values and associat-
ing themselves with global movements.27 
Any claim to exception of the sort I have described carries a risk of 
political manipUlation. This includes claims made on religious 
grounds. The political manipulation of religion has been evident, for 
example, in the last Balkan wars, notably in forging a link between 
religion and nationalism. Religious identities there gained an overrid-
ing importance in recent years as a result of the extreme violence of 
25. Gerrie ter Haar, Halfway to paradise: African Christians in Europe. Cardiff: 
Cardiff Academic Press, 1998. 
26. As Jackie Selebi, then Director-General of the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 'pointed out at a ceremony in Geneva on 12 August 1998 when 
he received a human rights award. 
27. One interesting example has been recorded by Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal plural-
ism and transnational culture: the Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli tribunal, 
Hawai'i, 1993', in Richard A. Wilson (ed.), Human rights, culture and context: 
Anthropological perspectives. London and Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997, pp. 28-
48. 
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the conflict. It has been argued that it is not religion, but a 'politics of 
identity' which turned minor differences into major divides and set 
different believers against each other.28 This may equally prove true of 
situations of conflict between religious groups in other parts of the 
world where people previously lived in relative harmony. 
Conflict is often exacerbated when religion becomes a tool in the 
hands of politicians or political interest groups and is thus used to cre-
ate, maintain or strengthen a factional position. It is the political 
manipulation of religion which causes secularists to mistrust reli-
giously inspired arguments about human rights. Indeed, there can be 
no doubt that religion may easily be associated with the violation of 
human rights. But this observation is not sufficient to disqualify reli,;. 
gious belief as an instrument for the propagation and protection of 
human rights. In some countries it is argued that the secular ideology 
of the state is itself a root cause of, and not the solution to, religious 
violence, because it fails to take account of the religious 'values of cit-
izens. This is the case in India, for example, where some thoughtful 
scholars advocate the creation of a state based on the original Hindu 
tradition of religious tolerance.29 The fact is that in any society where 
a substantial n~mber of people profess religious belief, religion has a 
role to play in protecting human rights, just as it can have a role in 
violating them. 
28. Ger Duyzings, Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo. London: Hurst & 
Co., 1999. 
29. Cf. Dick Kooijman, 'Religieuze tolerantie en seculiere staat in India', Wereld en 
Zending, 1999, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 97-106. One leading intellectual advocating 
this point of view is the social psychologist Ashis Nandy; see notably his essay 
'The politics of secularism and the recovery of religions tolerance' in Veena 
Das (ed.), Mirrors of violence: Communities, riots and survivors in South Asia. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
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In other words, we should not deny the legitimacy of various societies 
developing their own methods for solving problems of human rights.3D 
In fact, sensitivity to cultural diversity is, in my view, a precondition 
for the successful inculturation of human rights. But cultural sensitiv-
ity - an open-mindedness about the potentials of unfamiliar cultures 
- is not the same as cultural relativism. Whereas the former makes 
possible a process of dialogue which can be mutually enriching, the 
latter leads to a separate development of human rights. 
Religion and culture 
The tendency to emphasize differences between cultures rather than 
to focus on what may bind them leads to some important philosophi-
cal questions. The most pressing of these is perhaps, in view of our 
subject, the question whether cultural particularism breeds moral par-
ticularism. In other words, if we adhere to the primacy of cultural 
diversity, on the grounds that there exists a range of specific cultural 
identities, can we at the same time uphold the existence of moral stan-
dards which override a particular cultural tradition, such as those 
embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? If not, the 
only logical alternative is to believe that each culturally defined enti-
ty should adopt its own separate human rights standards. This, we 
may note, is the logical corollary of both Huntington's argument 
about cultural difference and of the more extreme advocates of multi-
culturalism within Western societies. This is an unappealing prospect 
in my view. Rather, we should aim to develop global moral connec-
30. We may quote in this connection Richard A. Wilson, who states that 'It is possi-
ble to have contextualization without relativization, since one can keep open the 
. possibility, and in the dying embers of the twentieth century, the likelihood,. that 
contexts are interlinked through a variety of processes.' Just because a cultural 
form is global, he argues, it does not mean that everyone relates to it in the 
same way ('Human rights, culture and context: an introductibn', in Wilson, 
Human rights, c~.tlture and context, p. 12). 
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tions, asking o)1rselves what moral relationships a global culture cre-
ates. This has also been suggested by Michael Ignatieff, who calls for 
a type of involvement which will be 'a crucial new feature of the 
modem moral imagination' .31 Since religion is the idiom in which 
many people express their views about the world, it will need to be 
part of such a moral imagination. 
I should say at this juncture that the conventional Western idea of 
what religion is, and the way we apply this to the issue of human 
rights, has been much influenced by the so-called world religions.32 
The concept of world religions is normally applied to religions based 
on a written authority, notably Christianity and Islam. Scholars and 
others often contrast these with so-called ethnic religions, usually 
meaning in effect religions which have no sacred book but which are 
based on oral traditions. In such a classification, 'ethnic religions' are 
connected to a specific ethnic group or 'tribe'and its culture. Such 
notions were coined during colonial times by the West in regard to 
people not like us, and are intrinsically connected to concepts of race. 
In our time, the concept of ethnicity has come to replace the nine-
teenth-century concept of race in the definition of perceived differ-
ences between. human populations.33 The main attraction of using the 
term 'ethnic' appears to lie in its usefulness in the process of 'other-
ing', that is in distinguishing systematically between 'us' and 'them' .34 
31. Michael Ignatieff, The warrior's honor, pp. 5 and 98. 
32. For a scholarly and critical analysis of the term 'religion' in different historical 
and social contexts, see Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk (eds.), The prag-
matics of defining religion: Contexts, concepts and contests. Leiden: Brill, 
1999; notably the Epilogue by Platvoet, 'Contexts, concepts and contests: 
towards a pragmatics of defining religion', pp. 463-516. . 
33. In his book Race and ethnicity in modem Britain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), the sociologist David Mason provides analytical insight into the 
mechanisms involved in this process, drawing attention to the important distinc-
tion between difference and diversity. 
34. See, for example, the critical comments made by Teresia Binga in a short essay, 
'Inculturation and the otherness of Africans: some reflections', in a volume 
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In the same vein, ethnic religions tend to be regarded as innate, closed 
and static in character, and thus different from world religions, which 
are deemed open to all peoples and conscious of a universal voca-
tion.35 
This view, although conventional, is today in dire need of revision, 
not only because it is not congruent with observable facts, but also 
because it gives comfort to cultural relativists. 'World' or 'universal' 
religions have developed firm roots in local cultures around the world 
as a consequence of modern processes of globalization. An unprece-
dented diversity has arisen within these religions, which is evidenced 
by popular forms of religious expression. In such cases, interpretation 
of scripture is increasingly adapted to the local context of the believ-
ers. At the same time, a movement has talcen place in the opposite 
sense, as so~called 'ethnic' or 'tribal' religions are increasingly taldng 
on universal characteristics. This is so, for example, with African tra-
ditional religions, which can be found in various parts of the world.36 
Formerly this was a consequence of the transatlantic slave trade; 
today African religious traditions have travelled overseas through the 
international inigration that is a hallmark of modern 
globalization.Yoruba religion is now more flourishing in New York 
about the perceived otherness of Africa, Inculturation: Abide by the othemess 
of Africa and Africans, edited by Peter Turkson & Frans Wijsen, Kampen: Kok, 
1994, pp. 10-18. 
35. In some cases, world religions have proven to be a colonial invention. This is 
, the case with Hinduism, which was constructed by the British in the 19th cen-
tury as a unitary national religion, a process which some have described as the 
'semitification' of Hinduism in the modern era. Thare are also scholars who 
argue that being Hindu has no religious connotation whatsoever. See Richard 
King, 'Orientalism and the modern myth of ''Hinduism''', Numen, vol. XLVI, 
no. 2, 1999,pp. 146-185. 
36. Universalization is only one remarkable tendency in the current process of revi-
talization of African traditional religions. See Rosalind Hackett, 'Revitalization 
in African Traditional Religion', in Jacob K. Olupona (ed.), African traditional 
religions in contemporary society. New York: Paragon House, 1991, pp. 135-
149. 
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than in Lagos. Muslim brotherhoods ·are maldng converts in Chicago 
and are firmly established in southern Europe. There are churches 
founded by Africans which have now become international, and 
which have branches a few Idlometres from where we are now sit-
ting.37 Processes of inculturation and contextualization have caused 
so-called world religions and ethnic religions to resemble each other 
more closely in structure. Both have become grounded in the particu-
lar culture where they are being practiced, allover the world. 
These dynamics of change need to be considered in any up-to-date 
analysis of the relationship between religion and human rights. Only 
then can we aim to malce the global moral connections that are need-
ed if basic human rights are to be upheld worldwide. 
Being human 
If anything can be said about the great diversity of religions in the 
world, it is that they all perceive good and evil to be part of the human 
condition. They concern themselves with exploring the nature of 
these qualities, the relationship between them, and methods of keep-
ing these two forces under control. 'The wise man', states the 
Moroccan sociologist Muhammad Guessous, commenting on what 
his fellow-countrymen believe to be the essence of a human being, 'is 
the man who does not expect good things in this life but who talces 
precautiQns to minimize the evil. '38 
To minimize evil, Guessous observes, Moroccans believe that a per-
son needs to do two things: to work hard and to worship. Ora et lab-
ora, others might say. Most religious traditions recognize the need to 
worship in order to minimize evil, meaning everything which is seen 
37. Gerrie ter Haar, Halfway to paradise. 
38. Quoted in Kevin Dwyer, Arab voices: The human rights debate in the Middle 
East. London: Routledge, 1991, p. 119. 
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as reducing the quality of human life, including illness, poverty and 
death. Religious believers are ultimately aware that successful living 
is dependent on their relationship with an invisible world, which they 
believe to be inhabited by spiritual forces that can malee their presence 
felt in the visible world. Religious practice, therefore, consists to a 
large extent in a sldllful manipulation of these unseen forces in order 
to manage the good and evil humans experience in their lives. 
All societies have some concept of evil, and of the way in which 
human beings are implicated. In many societies such ideas are 
expressed through discourses of religion. Accusations of witc~craft; 
for example, are one way in which people may express the notion that 
evil can take on a human form.39 The belief in witchcraft is a popular 
one, in the sense that it is widely held, notably but not only in Africa. 
It expresses an essentially religious idea about human nature, which 
may find a different expression in other cultures. For, even where reli-
gion has been abandoned as an explanatory model, secular ideologies 
have emerged which deal with the same question of how to manage 
and ward off manifestations of eviL 
Both religious and secular ideologies tend to ascribe evil notably to 
those who are not considered people 'lilee us'. Both types of ideology 
have shown a capacity to destroy the lives of others by placing them 
outside the category of humans. The way in which this happens may 
differ, but in all cases it implies some form of disqualification as a 
person. In 1914, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
observed in relation to a war between Greece and Bulgaria that 'Day 
39. A point in case is present-day South Africa, where in certain parts of the coun-
try witchcraft accusations have become so frequent that the national govern-
ment has set up various organs to try and tackle what has become a grave social 
problem which has led in recent years to the violent death of hundreds of peo-
ple. Under the umbrella of SANPAD, the South Africa-Netherlands Programme 
on Alternatives in Development sponsored by the Dutch government, a research 
programme has been developed with the title 'Crossing witchcraft barriers in 
South Africa'. 
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after day the Bulgarians were represented in the Greek press as a race 
of monsters, and public feeling was roused to a pitch of chauvinism 
which made it inevitable that war, when it should come, should be 
ruthless .... Deny that your enemies are men and you will treat them as 
vermin' .40 Something similar happened during the Second World War, 
when whole groups were described as not fully human, not 'people 
like us'. Anti-Arab pogroms in 1950s Algeria were known to French 
settlers as 'ratonnades' or 'rat-hunts'. In preparation for the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, the organs of state and mass communication 
consistently conveyed the message that part of the population were 
actually 'cockroaches' .41 Examples from all parts of the world indi-
cate how effective and how lethal dehumanising is as a mechanism of 
exclusion. It denies humanity to a person or a group. It is one extreme 
of the process of 'othering', or the constitution of a primal opposition 
between 'us' and 'them'. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recall, this is 
a process which talces place permanently in less radical forms in all 
societies. It is for that reason that minority groups are everywhere in 
a vulnerable position. When their otherness becomes justified by an 
ideology either religious or secular, they risk different treatment on 
the grounds that they are, after all, different. Hence, they may be 
deemed to have fewer rights than people like us, or even no rights at 
all. 
This clearly has major implications for human rights, which are 
claims that individuals are entitled to malce simply by virtue of their 
status as .human beings. It raises a question not So much about the 
nature of rights, as about the nature of humanity. In any particula,r cul-
ture or society, what do people think constitutes a human being? And 
who is therefore qualified to claim human rights? In most cases, the 
answer is to be found in the belief system of people. These questions 
are fundamental for understanding the relationship between religion 
40. Quoted in Allen & Seaton, The media of conflict, p. 46. 
41. See Alison Des Forges, Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda. New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 
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and human rights. In many cultures, people attach overwhelming 
importance to the spiritual dimension of a person, believing that it is 
this which defines him or her as possessing a truly human identity.42 
In other cases, human identity is not considered a fixed category, but 
something fluid. In some forest countries of West Africa, for example, 
it is widely believed that people closely resemble certain animals, 
including leopards and chimpanzees, and may even take on some of 
their characteristics.43 Similar examples can be found allover the 
world. New Zealand, for example, recently became the first country 
to recognise in law the status of the great apes, as man's closest rela-
tives. This step was talcen on the basis of scientific evidence tl;1at the 
great apes share not only our genes but also basic human traits such 
as self-awareness and intelligence.44 
Societies, moreover, hold different views about the precise point at 
which true human life may be identified, and when it ceases. In some 
cultures, very young children may be lawfully lalled on the grounds 
that they are not, or not yet, really human. A similar debate on the def-
inition of humanity talces place in Western societies today, in relation 
to such questions as abortion, euthanasia, and gene technology. In 
many places, theologians or other religious specialists decide upon 
such matters. In Western society, questions such as these are now 
42. Among the Alean in Ghana or the Yoruba in Nigeria, for example, the spiritual 
, dimension of a person is deemed an essential part of the human condition. We 
find similar ideas in all parts of the world, where the human world and the spirit 
world are believed to be interrelated in a way which has become uncommon in 
the West. 
43. Paul Richards, 'Local understandings of primates and evolution: some Mende 
beliefs concerning chimpanzees', in R. Corbey & B. Theunissen (eds.), Ape, 
man, apeman: Changing views since 1600. Leiden: Dept. of Prehistory, Leiden 
University, 1995, pp. 265-273. See also Stephen Ellis, The mask of anarchy: 
The destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war. 
London: Hurst & Co., 1999: esp. pp. 220-280. 
44. 'New Zealand gives human rights to great apes', Noseweek, Dec. 1999/Jan. 
2000, no. 28,p. 12. 
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largely referred to experts in medical ethics. By replacing the theolo-
gians, they have become the secular moralists of our time. 
Conclusion 
Let me summarize my argument at this point. 
Present circumstances, I have argued, require a reconsideration of the 
relationship between religion and human rights. Religion, or religious 
belief, I suggest, while often seen as a root cause of violent conflict, 
is in fact a particular expression of human sentiments and ideas which 
are also present in secular cultures. In most cases the outbreak of vio-
lence cannot be ascribed to the nature of religious belief as such since, 
like all human institutions, religion can be used for either constructive 
or destructive purposes. Its resources can be applied both for the pro-
tection of human rights and for their violation. The challenge is to try 
and exploit the positive resources which are present in virtually all 
religions. 
So far, little use has been made by human rights promotors of the 
world's religious and spiritual resources.45 An intelligent use of reli-
gious resources requires and presupposes a serious consideration of 
religion as an important factor in people's lives. In this one respect, 
we can agree with Huntington, when he concluded his sombre analy-
sis with a call to develop a more profound understanding of the basic 
religious and philosophical assumptions underlying what he describes 
as 'other civilizations' .46 
I have further argued that globalization contains, almost inevitably, a 
tendency towards the globalization of moral ideas in connection with 
45. One notable exception is the Parliament of the World's Religions, which gathers 
men and women from religious and spiritual traditions all over the world to dis-
cuss issues of common concern. 
46. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', p. 49. 
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human rights, whether these ideas are based on a religious or secular 
ideology. Consequently, cultural relativism, which demands a posi-
tion of exception, is becoming an increasingly untenable stance. At 
the same time; it must be clear that universalizing human rights is not 
the same as Westernizing human rights. For the inculturation of 
human rights must be a two-way process, in which Western propo-
nents of human rights learn and accept that certain values derived 
from a culture which is originally not theirs may actually be of use to 
therp. too. These may include religious values. 
Finally, given the fact that human rights are claims that people are 
entitled to malce simply because of being human, I have emphasized 
the importance for all of us, in and outside the Western world, of con-
sidering the fundamental question which underlies all human rights 
thought: what is a human being? This is necessary if we are to deve-
lop a proper understanding of the process which begins with labelling 
people as different from us, and which can lead, through excesses of 
language, to the grossest violation of human rights. The same ques-
tion draws us towards ideas about good and evil which are prominent 
in many religions in the world and which to a greater or lesser extent 
guide people's actions towards others and thus have a bearing on 
human rights. 
I 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
The profound changes that the world is experiencing today impel us 
to examine religion anew, as one of the agents of social change. The 
Chair which is being inaugurated today may be seen as a recognition 
of the importance of such an approach, notably in regard to human 
rights. 
In the years to come I hope to investigate further some of the ideas 
which I have sketched in the last hour, notably in view of the role of 
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religion in situations of conflict. In implementing such a programme, 
it is particularly important in my view to examine the views of ordi-
nary believers in matters of human rights, and not limit ourselves to 
the views of religious and political elites. This implies focusing less 
on scriptural traditions than on ideas which are expressed in other 
forms. At the same time, any analysis of religion and human rights 
requires empirical study of the actual situations in which these ideas 
are expressed. For, as the British anthropologist Richard Wilson has 
noted, human rights are founded not in the eternal moral categories of 
social philosophy, but are the result of concrete social struggles.47 
The debate on religion, human rights and social change is not an aca-
demic debate only. Its subject matter is of equal importance to all who 
are concerned about human rights in the world, or talce an interest in 
understanding processes of change. I consider it my task to share aca-
demic insights with interested parties outside the academic world. As 
incumbent of the Chair I will therefore try and stimulate debate on rel-
evant matters within a wider public circle. It is in this light that I 
would like to draw your attention to a forthcoming series of Open 
Seminars about 'Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change', 
organised' at the ISS under the auspices of the Chair, which will start 
at the end of this month and will continue in May. 
The Chair on Religion, Human Rights and Social Change is an 
Extraordinary Chair in more than one sense. As far as I am aware it 
has 'no equivalent in the world. We can all be grateful to the founders 
of the Chair - the organizations Cordaid, ICCO, and the World 
Conference for Religion and Peace - for having taken this unique ini-
tiative. It is a great privilege for me to be t:he first person to occupy 
this position. I would like to thank both the members of the Board and 
the Curatorium of the Foundation established in connection with the 
Chair for their active interest in the Chair and their support to its 
47. Wilson, Human rights, culture and context, p. 23, 
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incumbent. I greatly appreciate that, and I hope you will find that this 
new Chair will also benefit the work of the founding organizations. 
I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Board of the Institute 
of Social Studies, which has welcomed this new Chair as part of its 
body. I strongly believe that the study of religion has an important 
contribution to make to the life of the Institute, not only in matters 
concerning human rights and social change, but also in fostering 
broader thought about development issues. I hope that any contribu-
tion I am able to make under the auspices of the Chair will help with 
the constant new thinking which is taldng place in this field, both in 
this Institute and in the wider world. 
I want to thank the ISS staff, both academic and administrative, for 
the way they have made me feel welcome in their midst. With your 
helpfulness you have made my arrival in this new environment a most 
pleasant one, and your forthcoming attitude has soon provided me 
with a sense of belonging. I feel among 'people like us'. I owe a spe-
cial thanks to my colleagues in Staff Group 2 who, each in their own 
way, have contributed to my immediate job satisfaction. It is my 
greatest wish to be able to collaborate with you in the years to come 
in a mutually beneficial way. You can rest assured that I will do all 
that I can to further that aim. 
To the ISS students I wish to say that I hope that you too will experi-
en~e the new Chair and its activities as an asset to your work and your 
stay at the Institute. For me, your presence is a great challenge as it 
presents me with a unique opportunity to learn from your knowledge 
and experience, acquired in the various countries from which you 
have come. 
As one should never forget where one comes from, I want to include 
in my thanks my colleagues and friends in the mundane business of 
the study of religion in various universities and departments. I thank 
you all for your continuing friendship and support. Since I am not 
planning to leave you, I am sure we will continue to cooperate. 
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Finally, life would not be worth living if one were not sustained by 
personal networks of affection. I therefore thank all of you who lmow 
you are dear to me for being with me today, as I know you will con-
tinue to be in the future. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you all for your attention. 
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